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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the statute would then be realized. The statute would then truly bind those
who knowingly take the benefit of improvements on their land, for if not
intending to be bound, .it would give them not only the opportunity but the
burden of showing a contrary intention.
INNOCENT PARTICIPANTS IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Copyright is the negative right to prevent the appropriation of the labors of an
author by another. As otherwise expressed, "copyright is merely a special
application of the command, 'Thou shalt not steal!' " However, unlike larceny,
the presence of animus furandi is no essential element to a literary piracy. The
purpose of the copyright act is to secure to authors, composers and other artists
the financial fruits of their intellectual labors. This purpose would be defeated
if defendants were allowed merely to prove lack of guilty intention in order to
escape liability for the infringement of copyright. However, with the advent of
motion pictures, radio, and other scientific developments the mechanics of
copyright infringement have become complicated and require the participation of
many persons. Thus responsibility for infringement, in many cases, can no
longer be traced to one person or a single combination of persons. Of times a
corps of people contribute to a literary piracy without whose combined efforts
the infringement could not have taken place. Thus far, scant attention has been
directed to the question of the extent of liability of innocent persons who
participate in an infringement of copyright.
Introduction
The author of an unpublished work, by the act of reducing the product of his
thought to concrete form as a book, musical score, or other literary composition,
obtains rights in the composition, conceived to be property rights.2 These rights
are essentially rights of exclusion. There vests in the author the exclusive right
to possess, use and dispose of the intellectual production.3 The common law
affords such composition protection which in no great respect differs from that
thrown about any other form of personal property.4 However, the common
1. Zollman, Radio and Copyright (1927) 11 MARQ. L. REV. 146, 147.
2. See Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 188 (1909); Jewelers'
Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 247, 49 N. E. 872, 873
(1898).
3. DROVE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLEcTUAL PRODUcTiONS (1879) 97. These rights
are incorporeal and exist separate and apart from the property in the paper on which
the composition is written. At common law the intellectual property right may be in one
person while title to the physical thing is in another. Wercbmeister v. Am. Lithographic Co.,
142 Fed. 827 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905), aff'd, 148 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Baker v.
Libbie, 210 Mass. 99, 79 N. E. 109 (1912). See 35 STAT. 1084 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 41
(1934). This also is true with regard to the rights granted the author by the Copyright Act,
Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. 528 (U. S. 1852).
4. See Paige v. Banks, 13 Wall. 608, 614 (U. S. 1871) ; Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v.
Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 247, 49 N. E. 872, 873 (1898).
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law rights are limited to unpublished works, and all common law property rights
therein are lost on publication.'
After publication, the author may obtain rights in his composition somewhat
akin to common law rights by complying with the terms of the copyright act.0
The rights granted by the copyright act are de novo and are not an extension
of the author's common law rights in the literary product.7 Theze rights also
are generally thought to be property rights.8 Therefore, any violation of the
rights by infringement is a tort and, except as modified by statute, is governed
by the rules applicable to torts generally.9
Notice
The copyright grant is more pervasive than that of any other legally
recognized property right. It is a right to exclude, not directed to any object
in possession, but is in vacuo, so to speak. It is a prohibition of conduct remote
from the persons or tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed
by persons thousands of miles away from the owner.10 In order, therefore, not
to make the prohibitions of the statute harsh beyond measure, protection to the
public is afforded by a strict requirement that notice of copyright,1" in the
manner provided for by statute,'2 be affixed to each copy of the work published
or offered for sale in the United States. The purpose of the requirement is to
give notice of the copyright in the work to the public and thereby prevent
innocent persons from suffering the penalty .of the statutes for reproduction of
the copyrighted work.' 3 Since statutory copyright is an original grant of rights
to the author, compliance with the provisions for notice is a condition precedent
to the vesting of the rights in the author.' 4 Therefore an omission of the re-
5. Note 2, supra. To constitute "publication" there must be such a dise nination of the
work of art itself among the public, as to justify the belief it took place with the intention
of rendering such work common property. See American Tobacco Co. v. Wercbmeister,
207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907).
6. The exclusive rights granted an author by the Copyright Act are set forth in 35 SrAT.
1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1934). They endure for twenty eight years and may be
renewed for a similar period. 35 STAr. 1OSO, 1oss (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. §§ 23, 24 (1934).
7. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U. S. 1834). See American Tobacco Co. v. Werchmester,
207 U. S. 284, 291 (1903). The common law rights and the rights granted by the Copyright
Act do not co-exist in the same composition. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strau, 210 U. S.
339, 346 (1908).
S. COPGER, THE LAw or CoPyRiG.HT (7th ed. 1936) 110. For a recent discus-ion on the
nature of the property interest involved in the word "copyright" see Umbrit, A Considera-
tion of Copyright (1939) 87 U. or PA. L. REv. 932.
9. See Ted Browne Mlusic Co. v. Fowler, 290 Fed. 751, 754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); 2 Lnss,
INTrmAsuOr_. A PRoacrioNz or Lruy AND ARTnsnc PaOPpTn (1938) 820.
10. See concurring opinion of Justice Holmes, White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1, 18 (1912).
11. 35 ST.r. 1077 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 9 (1934).
12. 35 STAT. 1079 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. §§ 18, 19 (1934).
13. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 55 (1884); Bentley v.
Tibbals, 223 Fed. 247, 253 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
14. Note 7, supra.
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quired notice on any published copy amounts to a forfeiture of the copyright
and dedication of the work to the public.'5 To mitigate the harsh effects upon
the author, of the rule regarding notice in 1909, Section 20 was added to the
Copyright Act, preserving the' copyright to proprietors who sought to comply
with the provisions of the Act with respect to notice but who omitted by accident
or mistake the prescribed notice from a particular copy or copies.
To balance the protection given to the author with the protection that
should be extended to the public Section 20 provides also for limited exemption
from liability for an innocent infringer who has been misled by the omission of
the copyright owner to attach proper notice to all copies of the work. The
section does not extend the innocent infringer's freedom from liability, but
actually serves to bar what would otherwise have been his unlimited right to
copy or deal in the work. The section operates to "prevent the recovery of
damages against an innocent infringer" and, in addition, provides that "in a suit
for infringement no permanent injunction shall be had unless the copyright
proprietor shall reimburse to the innocent infringer his reasonable outlay in-
nocently incurred if the court, in its discretion, shall so direct." Although, there-
under, an innocent infringer may not be assessed for the damages suffered by the
copyright owner as a result of the infringement, it has been held that the copyright
owner may have an accounting of the profits made by the infringer.10 The
innocent infringer, however, may recover reasonable outlay, incurred as a
result of the copyright proprietor's omission to affix proper notice, if the court
so directs.' 7  Whatever protection the section affords innocent infringers
15. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 212 Fed. 301 (S. D. N. Y. 1914), aff'd, 218
Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F. (2d)
556 (D. Mass. 1928). Publication of the composition, of course, operates to forfeit the
common law property which the author had in the work. However, a sample Is not a
published copy of the work, and omission of copyright notice thereon will not cause a
forfeiture of copyright in the principal work. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris and Bendiere,
23 F. (2d) 159 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Stecher Lithographic Co. v. Dunston Lithograph Co.,
233 Fed. 601 (W. D. N. Y. 1916). However, in a recent case, the Supreme Court held, three
justices dissenting, that the requirement of Section 12 of the Act that two copies of the
work be "promptly deposited" in the copyright office is not in the nature of a condition
precedent. The argument that copies of copyrighted works are kept on file at the copy-
right office for the purpose of permitting the public to be able to ascertain the existence of
copyright in any work is rejected. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 59 Sup. Ct.
397 (1939). But see (1939) 52 HAgv. L. Ray. 832.
16. Strauss v. Penn Printing & Publishing Co., 220 Fed. 977 (E. D. Pa. 1915). The
court arrived at its conclusion by interpreting this section in the light of Section 25 of the
Copyright Act. Section 25 provides that an infringer of copyright shall be liable "to pay
to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due
to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from the
infringement." Since Section 25 separately mentions profits and damages and Section 20
specifically prevents the recovery of damages but does not mention profits, the court ruled
that the legislature in framing Section 20 did not mean to exclude the innocent Infringer
from paying over to the copyright owner, profits made from the infringement.
17. Wilkes-Barre Record Co. v. Standard Advertising Co., 63 F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 3d,
1933).
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is denied to deliberate infringers and to persons who persist in the infringement
after actual notice of copyright is given.' s
Intent
The rules of law generally applicable to torts govern copyright infringement.10
Intention to infringe is not a necessary ingredient to an actionable infringement. -0
The author's property is absolute when perfected by copyright, and the innocent
intent or purpose of invasion is nowhere made an excuse for it.2 ' It is the result
of the act, not the intention with which it is done, that determines the question
of infringement. Honest intention, accordingly, constitutes no defence. Thus
one who intending to make a recording of the plaintiff's copyrighted musical
composition, as he lawfully might,22 made a copy of the song,23 had it orchestrated
and made the record, was held to have infringed the copyright by making the
copy of the song. All the records of the song made by him, which othervise
would not have infringed copyright, were held to be infringing copies.2 1 Also,
ignorance of copyright is no defence.25 One who copies from a plagiarist, with-
out knowledge of copyright, is himself an infringer?2 It was so held in a case
18. Shellberg v. Empringham, 36 F. (2d) 991 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); Stecher Lithographic
Co. v. Dunston Lithograph Co., 233 Fed. 601 (W. D. N. Y. 1916).
19. Note 9, spra.
20. M. Witmark v. Calloway, 22 F. (2d) 412 (E. D. Tenn. 1927); see Buck %% Jevell-
LaSale Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931).
21. DrozN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 406.
22. Prior to the amendment of Section 1 of the Copyright Act of 1909, by Coa-p. STmr.
(1916) 9517, the unlicensed manufacture of mechanical recordings of copyrighted com-
positions was not an infringement. White-Smith Mdusic Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U. S. 1 (1912).
23. Copying is prohibited by the act. 35 STAr. 1075 (1909) 17 U. S. C. A. § 1 (a) (1934).
24. Chappell & Co. Ltd. v. Columbia Gramaphone Co., [1914) 2 Ch. 745. Accord: Mac-
millan Co. v. King, 223 Fed. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
25. Edison v. Lubin, 122 Fed. 240 (C. C. A. 3d, 1903), appeal dismissed, 195 U. S. 625
(1904) (where defendant without knowledge of copyright reproduced motion picture fim
from which the notice of copyright had been detached by unknown pemons); Gilmore v.
Anderson, 38 Fed. 846 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 18S9) (where defendant had good reason to beleve
that the plaintiff's work had become public property).
26. American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Pub. Co., 120 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 7t, 1902),
appeal dismissed, 193 U. S. 675 (1904); Norris v. No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co., 271 Fed. 536
(D. Mld. 1921), aff'd, 277 Fed. 951 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921). Thee decisdons have been attached
by a dictum contained in a very recent case, Barry v. Hughes, 103 F. (2d) 42? (C. C. A.
2d, 1939). The court, per curiam, said: "It has been held that one who copies from a
plagiarist is himself necessarily a plagiarist, however innocent he may be (Am. Pres Ass'a
v. Daily Story Pub. Co., 7 Cir., 120 Fed. 766), but that would be a harsh reault, and
contrary to the general doctrine of torts. The wrong is copying; that is, using the author's
work as a source. A copy of a copy does indeed do just that, but one is orliarily liable
for only those consequences of one's acts which a reasonable person would anticipate
Laying aside a possible action for unjust enrichment, or for an injunction after di.covery,
we should hesitate a long while before holding that the use of material, apparently in the
public demesne subjected the user to damages, unless something put him actually on
notice.' Id. at 427.
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where the defendant obtained permission to copy from the infringer, who was the
one having apparent property in the work.2
7
If the copyright proprietor acts to mislead the public, it has been suggested that
then an innocent infringer might escape liability. Thus where an author copy-
rights a play under one title, produces it under another, a person who has been
misled by his action may be exempt from liability. But if the defendant was
aware of the change or was not misled by the copyright proprietor's action, the
defense would not hold.28
The British Parliament, in the Copyright Act of 1911, sought to throw some
measure of protection about the innocent infringer by exempting him from
liability to pay damages where he was not aware and had no reasonable ground
for suspecting that copyright subsisted in the work infringed.20  However, the
statute is framed in such language that, as one British writer points out,80 it is
difficult to imagine a case in which it can be invoked in aid of the infringer.
For within its construction there is a reasonable ground for suspecting almost
every published work to be copyrighted.3 '
The courts have not found it too difficult to justify liability attaching to an
innocent infringer. There is no hardship in holding liable a person who in-
nocently uses another's copyrighted material . . . "because the defendant knows
the work is not his, and that he has no original right to publish it. At his peril,
therefore, he undertakes to give the edition; he does it with his eyes open and
'whether it was property renounced or not', it was his business to inquire". 82
The defendant, having done what he intended, is liable for the consequences of
his act. Purity of intention does not exculpate a tortious act.
Principal Infringers
Infringement of copyright is a tort and all persons concerned therein are
jointly and severally liable.33 Participants in the infringement may be principal
or contributory infringers. A person who organizes and sets into motion a
venture which results in an infringement is the principal infringer. Although he
may act innocently there is every justification for holding him liable in damages
to the complainant. The act done was intended by him, and for all the con-
sequences, anticipated as well as unanticipated, the responsibility should be his.
27. Insurance Press v. Ford Motor Co., 255 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
28. Collier v. Imp Films Co., 214 Fed. 272 (S. D. N. Y. 1913).
29. 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 46 § 8 (1911): "Where proceedings are taken in respect of the
infringement of the copyright in any work and the defendant in his defense alleges that he
was not aware of the existence of the copyright in the work, the plaintiff shall not be
entitled to any remedy other than an injunction or interdict in respect of the Infringement
if the defendant proves that at the date of the infringement he was not aware and had no
reasonable ground for suspecting that copyright subsisted in the work." (Italics hiserted.)
30. Copn'NoaR, op. cit. supra note 8, at 160 et seq.
31. Byrne v. Statist Co. [1914] 1 K. B. 622. See CoPXNGER, loc. cit. supra note 30.
32. Sed Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2346, 98 Eng. Reprints 201, 224 (K. B. 1769);
American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Publishing Co., 120 Fed. 766, 769 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902),
appeal dismis'sed, 193 U. S. 675 (1904).
33. Note 9, supra.
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The profits are his and liability for torts committed are also his. Thus where a
publishing company prints and circulates an article submitted by one of its
contributors which infringes copyright the publisher, who acted innocently in
accepting the article, is liable equally with the infringer. The publishing com-
pany may not escape liability on the plea of innocence. It printed and circulated
the infringing article; it profited thereby; it was responsible therefor. In
another case unauthorized copies of a copyrighted photograph were struck off
by a lithographer. Notice of copyright was omitted from the infringing copies.
A newspaper publisher who obtained and published a copy of the photograph,
without knowledge of the copyright, was held to be liable in damages to the
owner for infringement.3 5
Contributory Infringcrs
The attitude of the courts today is to hold everyone liable who in any manner
has helped to create the infringing work.3s All such persons, except the principals,
are contributory infringers. Thus, the printer, the vendor and the binder of an
infringing work are all liable for the full extent of damages suffered by the
copyright owner.3 7  Liable also as a contributory infringer is the person who
induces or aids another to infringe a copyright,38 or to violate the conditions on
which his license to sell depends.39 The sale of an infringing play to another
with a view to its public presentation makes the seller a participant in causing
the play to be publicly presented and is liable therefore as an infringer.A0
The vendor of moving picture films is liable as a contributory infringer of the
dramatic performing rights in the work whose incidents are reproduced, although
taking no part in the exhibition of the pictures.4 1 Also the unauthorized sale
or distribution of copies of copyrighted work is an infringement."- It is im-
34. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207 (1935).
35. Altaman v. New Haven Union Co., 254 Fed. 113 (D. Conn. 1918).
36. Belford v. Scribner, 144 U. S. 433 (1892); Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 Fed.
412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
37. Belford v. Scribner, 144 U. S. 4SS (1892); American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed.
829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); Browne v. Fowler, 290 Fed. 751 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Greene v.
Bishop, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5763 (C. C. Mass. 1858). Dealers who make profit or commiesion
upon the sale of infringing copies are also liable. Stevens v. Gladding, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,399
(C. C. R. I. 1866).
38. Fishel v. Lueckel, 53 Fed. 499 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1892).
39. See Scribner v. Straus, 210 U. S. 352, 355 (1907).
40. Daly v. Palmer, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,552 (C. C. S. D. 1868).
41. Kalem v. Harper, 222 U. S. 55 (1911); Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co. [1926]
2 K B. 474.
42. Macmillan Co. v. King, 223 Fed. 862 (D. Mfas. 1914), applying 35 S,%T. 1075 (1909),
17 U. S. C. A. § 1 (a) (1934); Warne v. Seebohm, 39 Ch. D. 73 (188). Under the Englkh
Act, 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 46 § 2 (a) (1911), which deems a copyright to be infringed by any
person who "sells or by way of trade e.xposes or offers for ale"' any work which to his
knowledge infringes copyright, it has been held that a person who simply attempts to effect
a sale does not infringe copyright unless "he by way of trade e-xposes or offers for sale"
the infringing article. Britain v. Kennedy, 19 T. L. R. 122 (1903). See note 41, supra.
1939]
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material that the copies are distributed gratuitously and not sold for profit, 40
or that distribution is to a limited class of persons.44
The lithographer who innocently did the mechanical work of lithographing is
a guilty participant to the infringement. 45 One who sells or furnishes to another
a lithograph plate, intending or expecting such other to use it in the production
of infringing copies, is liable as a contributory infringer. 40 But it is otherwise
where the plate is capable of an innocent or non-infringing use, and it was sold or
furnished without intent or knowledge that it was to be put to an unlawful use.41
In order to escape liability in such case the burden is upon the defendant to prove
that he did not promote a guilty use of them.48
Master and Servant
The general rules of agency apply to cases of copyright infringement. The
master or principal is liable for infringement committed by his servant or agent
within the scope of employment, although the particular act may have been done
without express authority of the master or even against his orders. 40 The
compiler of a street directory is liable in damages for copyright infringement
where several of the canvassers employed by him disobeyed the instructions given
to them, and made up their returns largely from the complainant's copyrighted
publication instead of from their own investigations. Also, the knowledge
gained by an agent during the course of his employment that a certain thing has
been copyrighted is imputed to his principal. Thus, although he may have had
no actual knowledge of the copyright in the work, in an action for copyright
infringement where innocence would constitute a valid defence, the principal
cannot successfully plead ignorance of facts learned by his agent.51
An employee is also liable if he participates in an infringement, although acting
under the instructions of his employer. An agent is always personally liable for
torts committed by himself during the course of employment. It is no defence
that he acted under his employer's instructions, since the latter could not give
43. Novello v.. Sudlow, 12 C. B. 177, 138 Eng. Reprints 869 (1852) ; Hotten v. Arthur, 1
Hem. & M. 603, 71 Eng. Reprints 264 (Ch. 1863); Warne v. Seebohm, 39 Ch. D. 73 (1888).
However, one who had received infringing copies as a gratuity and without knowledge of
their infringing nature, is not liable for infringement even though he had made use of the
copies. Morris County Traction Co. v. Hence, 281 Fed. 820 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
44. Ager v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 26 Ch. D. 637 (1884). See
note 42, supra.
45. Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 Fed. 412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
46. Harper v. Shoppell, 28 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 2d, 1886).
47. See Harper v. Shoppell, 26 Fed. 519, 521 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886), rev'd on other
grounds, 28 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 2d, 1886).
48. See Harper v. Kalem, 169 Fed. 61, 64 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909), aff'd, 222 U. S. 55 (1911).
49. Witmark v. Calloway, 22 F. (2d) 412 (E. D. Tenn. 1927); McDonald v. Hearst, 95
Fed. 656, (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899) ; WEm, AmREmaN CoPYRIGxr LAW (1917) 446, 456.
50. Trow Directory, Printing and Binding Co. v. Boyd, 97 Fed. 586 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1899). Accord: West Pub. Co. v. Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1909),
modified, 176 Fed. 833 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
51. Christian v. American Druggist Syndicate, 285 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
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sanction to an unlawful act.12  However, a corporate officer is not personally
liable for infringements done by the corporation, unless he participated in them
as an individual.5 3
Independent Contractors
An employer, ordinarily, is not liable for acts done without his knowledge or
consent by an independent contractor which result in the commission of a tortP.
Logically this rule applies to copyright cases. But where the principal procured
the infringement to be done he is jointly liable with the contractor.P3 Moreover
a principal cannot contract so as to avoid liability when the act authorized is one
for which, in the ordinary course of business, he would be responsible. Thus one,
who employs a musician to perform in an eyliibition for profit under a contract
which gives the artist the sole right to determine the compositions to be played,
is nevertheless liable if the musician performs a copyrighted musical composition
without permission from the owner0 0 The employer cannot avoid liability on
the ground that the selection of compositions was placed outside of his control.
He has not the legal right to disclaim by contract responsibility for acts done
under his management.0 7  The employer is deemed to have taken part, and
to have given general authority to perform copyright compositions.
In several cases, proprietors of restaurants and places of amusement inter-
posed for their defence the fact that the bands which played the infringing songs
were independent contractors.05 The allegations were that they had no voice in
the selection of the musicians, had no control over the players, nor could they
determine the musical selections to be rendered during an evening's engagement.
In all these cases the courts rejected the argument that the bands were in-
dependent contractors. Certainly a simple direction to play music does not
request the performance of unlicensed songs. But the proprietors, by permitting
the bands to be sole arbiters of the selections to be played, did not exercise the
legal power of control which was theirs. An English court,0 9 after a careful
52. Estes v. Worthington, 30 Fed. 465 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1887) (trademark). See WEri.
op. cit. supra note 49, at 456; ABzouR, CoprvoGEr Lw ,_ND PRAMcEc (1936) 947. But under
REv. STAT. § 4965 (1875), which made the defendant liable to forfeit to the copyright
proprietor one dollar for every infringing copy "found in his possession," it was held that
an employee who was entrusted with custody of the infringing material does not have
"possession" within the meaning of the section and is not subject to the penaltie3 thereof.
Thorton v. Schreiber, 124 U. S. 612 (1888).
53. Buck %% Newsreel, 25 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1933); Performing Rights Society v.
Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate [1924] 1 K. B. 1.
54. HAsPiR, LAw or TORTS (1933) § 292.
55. Fishel v. Lueckel, 53 Fed. 499 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1892).
56. Witmark v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924), aff'd, 2 F.
(2d) 1020 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E. D. Pa. 1922).
57. See Performing Right Society v. Mitchell [1924] 1 IL B. 762, 773; Monaghan v.
Taylor, 2 T. L. R. 685 (1885).
58. Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 7th,
1929); Irving Berlin v. Daigle, 31 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); Buck v. Russo, 25 F.
Supp. 317 (D. Mass., 1938). See Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276, 278 (E. D. Pa. 1922). But
see (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rr'v. 828.
59. Performing Right Society v. Mitchell [1924] 1 K. B. 762. See Comment (1937) 8
Am L. REv. 239.
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analysis of a case presenting an identical fact situation, soundly concluded that
a master-servant relationship existed to which the ordinary rule of respondeat
superior should apply.
In several cases, ° owners of copyrighted compositions sought to join the
lessors of the auditoriums, in which the infringing performances took place,
with the artist in an action for copyright infringement. However it was held
that the lessor cannot be a co-infringer when he is in no sense an inducing party
to the infringement, and derives no profit from the infringement. Something
more than the mere relation of landlord and tenant must exist to give rise to a
cause of action against the lessor for infringement of copyright on the demised
premises. The lessor is not liable even if he is notified in advance by the copy-
right proprietor that the lessee intends to play some infringing composition and
is requested to bar the performance.0 '
Radio
Innocence as a defence in copyright cases has been offered most frequently in
actions brought for infringement of the copyright in musical compositions. The
early actions mostly involved proprietors of restaurants and places of amuse-
ment. However the appearance of radio on a large commercial scale has
manifoldly increased the number of actions brought for the infringement of
copyright in musical compositions against persons disclaiming liability because
of innocence.
The owner of a copyrighted musical composition is given the exclusive right
"to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit."0' 2 Since radio did not
exist for commercial purposes at the time of the last general revision of the
Copyright Act in 1909, the question arose whether the unauthorized broadcast
of a copyrighted song was an infringement. It was so held in the case of
Jerome H. Remick v. American Automobile Accessories Co.03 There the de-
fendant operated a radio station for the purpose of advertising its product. The
court decided the performance was public although the listeners were not
gathered together.64 "The artist," it was said, "is consciously addressing a great,
though unseen and widely scattered audience, and is therefore participating in
a public performance." 65  Secondly, although there was no direct charge for
the privilege of hearing the entertainment, the performance was nevertheless held
to be for "profit." The defendant received indirect payment by advertising its
60. Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254
Fed. 592 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
61. Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 Fed. 592 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
62. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 1 (e) (1934).
63. 5 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), cert. denied, 269 U. S. 556 (1925), rev'g, 298
Fed. 628 (S. D. Ohio 1924).
64. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no public
performance. 298 Fed. 628 S. D. Ohio (1924). The court considered and rejected the
opinion expressed in an earlier case that an unauthorized broadcast of a copyrighted
composition may violate the statute. Witmark v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D.
N. J. 1923).
65. See Remick v. American Accessories Co., 5 F. (2d) 411, 412 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
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name in the expectation and hope of making profits through the sale of its
products. Indirect profit is sufficient to cause a case to fall within the prohibition
of the statute.66 Thus the three ingredients necessary for an infringement of a
musical composition were found to be present: an unauthorized, public per-
formance, for profit, of a copyrighted song.
In the case of Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 7 the Supreme Court
answered a question which arose as a corollary to the Remick case. The LaSalle
Hotel maintained a master receiving set which was wired to loudspeakers con-
nected in the public and private rooms of the hotel. On one occasion, which was
made the basis of the suit, the hotel happened to tune in on its master set and
relay to the rooms an unlicensed broadcast of the plaintiff's copyrighted com-
position. There was no arrangement of any kind between the broadcaster and
the hotel. The Supreme Court certified this to be a "performance". Upon return
of this answer to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the reception thus defined as a
"performance" was held to be "public" and "for profit" and, in the particular
case the original broadcaster being unlicensed, to be an infringement.63 The
defendant had argued that the acts of the hotel were not a performance, because
no choice of selections was given to it. The operator of a radio receiving set must
accept whatever program is transmitted during the broadcasting period. How-
ever, in order to predicate liability, intention to infringe is not essential under
the act. Knowledge of the particular selection to be played is immaterial. One
who hires an orchestra for public performance for profit is not relieved from a
charge of infringement merely because he does not select the particular program
to be played. Similarly, when he tunes in a broadcasting station, for his com-
mercial purposes, he necessarily assumes the risk that in so doing he may infringe
the performing rights of another.
A dictum expressed by the court in the LaSalle caseP0 raised the question
66. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U. S. 591 (1917). In this case the Supreme Court decided
that there was a performance "for profit" by a band playing in a restaurant although there
was no admission charge to hear it. The court pointed out that the music is an incident
of other entertainment for which the public pays and therefore is "for profit"
67. 283 U. S. 191 (1931).
68. 51 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931). If the broadcasting company was licensed to
perform the copyrighted selection, the question remains open whether the license extends to
those who receive the broadcast. To that effect is a dictum in the LaSalle case, 283 U. S.
191, 198 (1931): "If the copyrighted composition had been broadcast by Duncan vith
plaintiffs' consent, a license for its commercial reception and distribution by the hotel
company might possibly have been implied." Cf. Buck v. Debaum, 40 F. (2d) 734 (S. D.
Cal. 1929), where the court held that the composer's license to the broadcasting company
extended, as far as reception is concerned, not only to those who "pick up" the copyriglhtcd
musical composition from the air for their own private use, but impliedly sanctioned and
consented to any "pick up" out of the air that was possible in radio reception. However,
a recent case held otherwise. Society of European S. A. A. C. v. N. Y. Hotel Statler Co., 19
F. Supp. 1 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). Accord: Performing Right Society v. Hammond's Bradford
Brewery Co. (1933), 150 L. T. 119; Canadian Performing Right Society v. Ford Hotel, Ltd.
(1935) 2 D. L. R. 391.
69. See 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931): "And since the public reception for profit in itself
constitutes an infringement, we have no occasion to determine under what circumstances a
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whether a broadcasting company which merely transmits the performance of a
copyrighted composition by another is liable for infringement. The few cases
decided concerning the question hold that where the performance transmitted
was unlicensed, the broadcaster is a contributory infringer, and his lack of
knowledge that there was going to be an unlicensed performance of a copyrighted
song is unavailable as a defence. 70 Probably, therefore, a broadcasting company
that broadcasts an athletic contest is liable for infringement of copyright if the
band plays a copyrighted song without a license. 71 Certainly, the possible
liabilities of a broadcasting company are too extensive, especially in view of
the public service they perform in presenting broadcasts of so many events of
public interest. Legislative attempts to exempt innocent infringers from liability
in cases of radio broadcasting have as yet been unsuccessful, but such legislation
would be desirable.72
Damages, Costs, and Counsel Fees
The same rules of damages apply to all copyright infringers. The innocent
infringer is liable for money damages to the same extent as the deliberate in-
fringer.73  The contributory infringer is jointly liable with the principal. 74
However, where the defendants have acted severally, and not jointly or in
concert, in committing an infringement, they cannot be sued jointly.r1 To sue
different parties jointly there must have been a common participation or concert
of action.
broadcaster will be held to be a performer." On the basis of this dictum, counsel for the
National Broadcasting Co., blithely concluded that broadcasters do not render public per-
formances for profit, and therefore licenses from the copyright owners to broadcasters would
seem unnecessary. Sprague, Copyright-Radio And The Jewell-LaSalle Case (1932) 3 AaR L.
REv. 417.
70. Remick v. General Electric Co., 16 F. (2d) 829 (S. D. N. Y. 1926). See Bladek,
Radio Broadcasting As An Infringement Of A Copyright (1939) 27 KY. L. REv. 295, 302. It
appears to this writer that "picking up" and broadcasting even a licensed performance of a
copyrighted composition should constitute such a "performance" by the broadcasting com-
pany which would make it liable for copyright infringement, unless separately licensed. The
LaSalle case held that the initial rendition does not exhaust the monopolies conferred by
statute and that a single rendition of a copyrighted piece may result in more than one
"performance." From the opinion in a recent case, Society of European S. A. A. C. v. Hotel
Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 (S. D. N. Y. 1937), it appears that where the defendant main-
tains elaborate nechanical equipment for the purpose of broadcasting or rebroadcasting any
transmitted program it gives a "performance" thereof. Consequently the broadcasting
company would be deemed to have "performed" the piece "for profit", and not being
separately licensed, it infringes copyright.
71. Where twenty bars of a copyrighted song were included in a motion picture It was
held that the entire picture infringed copyright. Hawkes & Son v. Paramount Film Serv.
[19341 Ch. 593 (C. A.)
72. See (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rav. 1044, 1045; (1934) 47 HAzv. L. REv. 703.
73. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 202 (1931).
74. Belford v. Scribner, 144 U. S. 488 (1892) ; Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 Fed. 412
(C. C. A. 2d, 1916); American Code Co., v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
75. Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 Fed. 751 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
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Persons infringing the copyright in any work protected by the act are liable to
an injunction restraining such infringement,7 0 and to pay to the copyright
proprietor such damages as he may have suffered due to the infringement, as
well as all profits which they shall have made from such infringement.77 How-
ever, in lieu of actual damages and profits, the plaintiff may be awarded such
damages as to the court shall seem just but which shall not exceed the sum of
$5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250.7s In the greater number of actions
brought against innocent infringers, the complainants have found it difficult to
prove damages. Consequently, in such cases the interpretation of this clause
figures prominently. The Supreme Court has decided that in all cases, even
where no provable damages were suffered by the complainant, the award must
not be less than the statutory minimum. 0 Where no actual damages are shown
the court generally limits itself to an award of minimum damages.P Occasionally
when such award appeared too burdensome, the court has reduced attorney's fees
allowed the complainant. 8' Whether statutory damages should be allowed or
an award of actual damages and profits, is not a choice resting with the plaintiff,8 2
but with the court.83 Where actual damages and profits can be proved, statutory
damages ordinarily will not be awarded.8 4 In awarding statutory damages the
act gives the court a yardstick which it may use in fixing the damages between
the minimum and maximum sums allowed.85 The court, however, is not bound
76. 35 SA . 1081 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (a) (1934).
77. 35 STAT. 1031 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (b) (1934).
78. Ibid. Before passage of the present statute proprietors of copyrighted works were
not protected where they could not prove actual damages. This was especially true in the
case of copyrighted musical compositions. Although the damage done to the owner of a
song by a single unauthorized rendition of his work is nominal, yet when a number of in-
fringements are accumulated, the damage to the proprietor is important. See Caplan, The
Measure of Recovery in Actions for the Infringement of Copyright (1939) 37 31ciIL L. RM.
564.
79. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 1C0 (1919) (copying); Jewell-
LaSalle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U. S. 202 (1931) (public performance).
80. Cunningham v. Douglas, 72 F. (2d) 536 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934), rev'd on other
grounds, 294 U. S. 207 (1935).
81. Fisher v. Dllingham, 298 F. 145 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); Cravens v. Retail, 26 F. (2d)
833 (M. D. Tenn. 1924).
In copyright actions the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's
fee, 35 STAr. 1084 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 40 (1934). In one case where the court felt that
the statutory maximum of $5000 was too small, the attorney's fee was correspondingly in-
creased to fill out the deficiency. Cory v. Physcal Culture Hotel Inc., 14 F. Supp. 977
(W. D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd, 8 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). But see Witmark v.
Calloway, 22 F. (2d) 412, 415 (E. D. Tenn. 1927).
82. Davella v. Brunswick-Balke Callender Co., 94 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert.
denied, 304 U. S. 572 (1933).
83. See Fargo Mere. v. Brecket, 295 Fed. 823, 829 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
84. Davella v. Brunswick-Balke Callender Co., 94 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); ree
Atlantic Monthly v. Post Pub., 27 F. (2d) 556, 560 (D. Mass. 1928).
85. 35 STAT. 1081 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (b) (1934): "First. In the case of a painting,
statue, or sculpture, $10 for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the
possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
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to follow this method.8 6 The statutory yardstick exists to enable the court to
arrive at a fair estimate of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. It should not
be applied where it is clear the copyright owner was not damaged to that extent.87
In all cases, however, the statutory minimum must be awarded.
The copyright act provides that full costs must be allowed the prevailing
party.88 Also, the usual rule that each party must pay his own counsel fee
has been deviated from in copyright cases, wherein the prevailing party may be
awarded reasonable counsel fees in the court's discretion.8 9
Conclusion
Suits for infringement of copyright in which innocence is pleaded as a defence
for the larger part have been directed against persons who have acted as
principals. These persons cannot be fully protected against liability without
defeating in measure the prime purpose of the Act which is "to promote the
progress . . . of useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors ... the
exclusive right to their respective writings. . . ."00 The same injury is done the
author whether the infringement be deliberatly or innocently motivated. Nor
is there justification for applying a separate, more lenient, measure of damages
to their case. The present provisions for money damages are, in the main, com-
pensatory and any reduction thereof is at the expense of the copyright owner.9'
Other considerations, however, should be directed to contributory infringers
who violate a copyright only as an incident to their normal business or occupa-
tion. These include printers, binders, lithographers, processors of films and
many others. In the ordinary course of business, they have no knowledge that
the materials they are processing infringe copyright nor have they any practical
means of ascertaining such violations. Since the last general revision of the
Copyright Act, in 1909, there has been considerable change in these industries.
"Second. In the case of any work enumerated in section 5 of this title, except a painting,
statue, or sculpture, $1 for every infringing copy made or sold or found in the possession
of the infringer or his agents or employees;
"Third. In case of a lecture, sermon, or address, $50 for every infringing delivery;
"Fourth. In the case of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or choral or orchestral com-
position, $100 for the first and $50 for every subsequent infringing performance; in the case
of other musical compositions $10 for every infringing performance."
86. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207 (1935).
87. See Turner & Dahnken v. Crawley, 252 Fed. 749, 754 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
88. 35 STAT. 1084 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 40 (1934).
89. Ibid.
90. U. S. Co NsT. Art. I, § 8.
91. The Copyright Act provides that the defendant be reimbursed for damages suffered
as a result of the infringement and for profits made by the infringer. 35 STAT. 1081 (1909),
17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (b) (1934). The most recent interpretation of this section limits the
recovery to that amount of the profits made by the infringer which are directly attributable
to the use of the complainant's work. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d)
45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), rev'g 28 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). Thus, In theory, the
profits which the complainant recovers are those which he himself might have made from
the use of his own work. See (1939) 8 FoRDHAA L. Rv. 263.
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They have become highly specialized. No longer is the publisher identified
with the printer, or the artist with the lithographer. Each has become separate
and distinct from the other. Moreover two large related industries have de-
veloped since then, namely, motion pictures and radio. It is certain that the
present act was never designed to cope with the problems they raise 2 The
courts apply a flexible interpretation to the act,03 but nevertheless its terms
may not be distorted in order to arrive at the most practical solution for present
conditions. The legislature is fully cognizant that a solution of the problem
created by the contributory infringer should be sought. The two most recent
bills proposed to Congress to amend the Copyright Act both contain provision
for the exemption from liability of the innocent contributory infringer. 4 Of
course, any general amendment of the Copyright Act is bound to affect the in-
nocent infringer. However, with considerable pressure being brought by many
groups whose interests in copyright legislation conflict,0 5 all recent legislation
to revise the Copyright Act has been defeated. Most groups ultimately seem to
prefer to maintain the status quo rather than chance the loss of some of the benefit
of the present act for possible greater gain by revision.00 Certainly, the time
has come for impartial examination of the present Copyright Act and for remedial
legislation, in the light of the great change that has occurred during the last
three decades.
92. See Bladek, supra note 70, at 313.
93. Remick v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F. (2d) 411, at 412 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925).
94. Duffy Bill, H. R. 2695, H. R. 3004, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) § 17; Sirovich Bill,
H. R. 11420, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) § 24 (c). See Legis. (1933) 51 Hnv. L. REv. 905.
95. See Solberg, Copyright Law Reform (1925) 35 Y,= L. 3. 43 and The Presert Copy-
right Situaion (1930) 40 YAI. L. 3. 184.
96. See Legis. (1938) 51 HAIv. L. Rav. 906, 907.
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